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Working on Immigration: Three Models of Labor and
Employment Regulation
Rick Su*
I. INTRODUCTION

The desire to tailor our immigration system to the economic interests of
our nation is as old as its founding. Yet after more than two centuries of
regulatory tinkering, we seem no closer to finding the right balance.
Contemporary observers largely ascribe this failure to conflicts over
immigration, from disagreements about its economic impact to differences of
opinion over the importance of economic interests in immigration
policymaking. This Essay offers a different explanation. Shifting the focus
away from immigration conflicts, I suggest here that longstanding
disagreements in the world of economic regulations-in particular, tensions
over the government's role in regulating labor conditions and employment
practices-explain much of the difficulty behind formulating an economic
approach to immigration. In other words, we cannot reach a political
consensus on how to regulate immigration in part because we cannot agree on
the role that the government should play in labor and employment regulations.
The fact is the development of labor and employment regulations in the
United States is far more contested than is often portrayed in the immigration
context. This is not only the case with respect to the kind of substantive
policies that should be pursued but also over the basic role that the
government regulations should play. As I argue in Part I, labor and
employment regulations at the federal level have traditionally been divided
between three different approaches to government intervention. The first sees
the federal government acting at the highest level of the national economy and
focusing mainly on the balance of macroeconomic forces such as the demand,
supply, and flow of capital, goods, and labor. The second sees federal action
at the organizational level, and primarily focuses on the bargaining process by
which business and workers negotiate terms and conditions of employment.
The third eschews the indirect influence of the first two models and posits that
the federal government sets substantive terms of labor and employment
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directly, guaranteeing them as a matter of individual right. The intent here is
not to show these to be independent and isolated approaches; U.S. economic
policy has always included aspects of all three. Nevertheless, as political and
ideological frameworks, they offer insights into how economic regulations
pertaining to labor and employment have developed at the federal level,
including those regulations pertaining to immigration.
Indeed, as I argue in Parts II and III, these three approaches have not
only shaped the historical development of our nation's immigration laws but
also continue to divide efforts toward comprehensive reform today. At the
most basic level, foregrounding the contested history of labor and
employment regulations in this manner offers a conceptual lens for
understanding the different ways the immigration regulations have evolved,
from early efforts to tax and control the importation of immigrant labor to
later initiatives aimed at specifying the terms of immigrant employment or
whether they can work at all. These competing approaches also shed light on
how immigration regulations have been implemented as an administrative
matter, including the different times when the U.S. Departments of Treasury,
Labor, and Justice were delegated primary responsibility.'
After outlining this history in Part II, Part III turns to today's immigration
debates. Here, I argue that labor and employment regulations-from those
designed to raise the minimum wage to those that seek to foster union
organizing-offer many ways for influencing the flow of immigration and finetuning its many effects on the American economy and its workers. That we
cannot agree on how these and other economic regulations can be used to reach
an immigration compromise, however, reflects more the ongoing disagreements
that we have about the federal government's role in regulating labor and
employment conditions. From this perspective, today's immigration debates
may simply be a small part of a much larger debate over the role of economic
regulations more generally. Indeed, it may be that the future of immigration
regulations, not unlike its past, will ultimately depend on how the economic
debate over labor and employment regulations is resolved.
II. COMPETING APPROACHES TO LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS

The 1930s and 1940s was a pivotal time for economic regulations at the
federal level. Indeed, it was during this period that Congress passed three
landmark pieces of economic legislation concerning labor conditions and
employment practices within the United States. The first was the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, which formalized the collective bargaining
process between workers and employers. 2 The second was the Fair Labor

1. See LISA MAGARIA, STRADDLING THE BORDER: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE INS 13 (2003).
2. Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
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Standards Act of 1938, which established a federal minimum wage and a
forty-hour workweek. 3 The third was the Employment Act of 1946, which,
along with its amendment in 1978, committed the federal government to
ensuring "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" through
the use of trade, fiscal, and monetary policies. 4
It is easy to assume that these three laws constitute a concerted federal
effort addressing labor and employment in the United States. All three were
crafted in response to the economic collapse of the Great Depression; all three
had roots in the New Deal. At the same time, there are important differences
between them as well. Each envisions government intervention at a different
level in the national economy. Each adheres to a different view about what
kind of employment terms the government should set, if any. Indeed,
underneath their similarities, I suggest that these laws actually reflect three
distinct regulatory approaches to how the federal government has sought to
I describe the
regulate labor conditions and employment practices.
approaches they represent in more detail here and show how much of the rich
history and contested development of labor and employment regulations can
be seen as a struggle between these three views about the role of government
intervention in our domestic economy.
A. The MacroeconomicApproach to LaborandEmployment

One way in which labor conditions and employment practices have
historically been addressed at the federal level is through policies focused on
the macroeconomic conditions in which they arise. These include fiscal and
monetary policies designed to foster economic growth or achieve "full
employment." It also includes trade and immigration policies designed to
manage the flow of capital, goods, and labor across our borders. Focused as it
is on these policies, the macroeconomic approach envisions the federal
government acting primarily at the highest levels of the national economy.
Moreover, rather than seeking to influence domestic labor conditions and
employment practices directly, it sees the federal government's role primarily
in setting the ideal economic conditions in which the optimal negotiations can
be reached in a competitive labor market.
The macroeconomic approach reflects some of the oldest economic
regulations at the federal level. This approach is also featured in some of the
most prominent economic policies of recent years. For most of the nineteenth
century, the federal government not only relied on the imposition of different
tariffs on imports and exports as its main source of income, but these tariffs
also constituted an important means of directing the financial futures of
3. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19).
4. Pub. L. No. 79-304, 60 Stat. 23 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (2006)), amended by Pub. L.
No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101-52).
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different sectors of the U.S. economy. 5 At the same time, foreign policies in
the early years of this republic focused on reaching trade deals to become
"most-favored nations" with trade partners, just as negotiations over free trade
agreements occupy much of foreign affairs today.6 With the expansion of the
federal tax base and the establishment of the Federal Reserve in the early
twentieth century, fiscal and monetary policies have become more prominent
as a means of addressing imbalances in the national economy.7 Yet, while the
tools of economic regulations have expanded, more traditional tools of
macroeconomic regulations are still politically relevant. Indeed, as we will
explore in more detail later, because of their impact on the domestic supply of
labor, immigration policies have long been viewed as a means by which
macroeconomic conditions can be regulated.
There is a lot of appeal to looking at the federal government's role in
economic regulations from this perspective. First, it draws directly upon
many of the powers explicitly delegated to the federal government as a
constitutional matter-from jurisdiction over foreign affairs and international
commerce to its interest over territorial sovereignty and the national economy.
Second, given the scale of these regulatory measures, it seems to fit well with
the institutional capacities of the federal government. To be sure, as a means
of affecting labor and employment conditions on the ground, the
macroeconomic approach is the most indirect. Yet, it also adheres to a very
coherent view about the federal government's role in this regard: the federal
focus should be on establishing the ideal market conditions in which more
specific terms of labor conditions and employment practices can be optimally
resolved by market dynamics and private bargaining.
B. The Labor Question and Government FacilitatedSelf-Regulation

Regulation directed at macroeconomic conditions is not the only way
that the federal government has sought to shape labor conditions and
employment practices in the United States. Another approach sees the
government more actively involved at an intermediate level of the national
economy-namely, the institutional relationship between labor and capital.
Like the macroeconomic approach, the substantive terms of employment are
still understood to be the product of private contractual negotiations between
economic actors. Nevertheless, rather than merely addressing the economic
conditions in which such negotiations take place, this approach imagines a
much more active role for the federal government in ensuring that the
bargaining process itself is fair and balanced. Marc Eisner refers to this
5. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXAION INAMERICA: A SHORTHISTORY 20-23 (1996); WILuIAM
ANTHONY LOVEIT ETAL, U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 45-46 (2d ed. 2004).
6. See LOVETT, supra note 5, at 41, 79-82.
7. See, e.g., JOHN T. WOOLLEY, MONETARY POLITICS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE POLITICS OF
MONETARY POLICY 108 (1984).
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process-oriented approach as "government supervised self-regulation." And
in the context of labor and employment, it is most strongly associated with
federal efforts to structure and supervise collective bargaining between large
firms and labor unions.
Industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century radically
transformed the economic structure of American society. It is no wonder then
that, with its onset, the focus of economic regulations at the federal level
shifted as well. The rise of wage labor raised questions about the freedom and
efficiencies of the private labor market.9 Moreover, with increasing growth
and consolidation of firms in various industries, workers began looking for
ways to increase their collective influence by forming and acting through ever
larger labor organizations. 10 All the while, the "labor question" became a
central focus in economic policymaking. 1 When the federal government
enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, the labor movement was
already in full swing. Nevertheless, the passage of this law turned the
collective bargaining process into a formal government policy involving
regulatory mandates and administrative oversight. Employers were required
by the law to negotiate in good faith. 12 Unions gained formal recognition by
following certain procedures.13 And with the establishment of the National
Labor Relations Board, the federal government became an integral part of the
contractual bargaining process by which labor conditions and employment
practices were set. 14 Of course, the federal stance on union organizing and
collective bargaining would change many times in the subsequent decades.
Nevertheless, for most of the twentieth century, the relationship between
firms and labor organizations was a central part of federal economic
policymaking.
All of this contributed to a unique perspective on how issues of labor and
employment should be regulated as a matter of governmental policymaking.
Managing the balance of power between labor and unions, and facilitating
their private negotiations at the bargaining table, became in essence the focus
of federal policy. The goal was to first incentivize employers and workers to
regulate themselves, and they did so by facilitating the process by which the
two most interested parties would keep each other in check. Indeed, it was
largely through private negotiations between large firms and unions that some
of the most important matters of domestic economic policy were developed in
the mid-twentieth century: from wage and working conditions on the one hand
8.

MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 5, 75 (1993).
CLAYTON SINYAI, SCHOOLS OF DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR

9. See

MOVEMENT 18-19 (2006).

10. See id.at 20-21.
11.

See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 12-13 (2002).

12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
13. Id § 159(a).
14. Id § 153.
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to the provision of health insurance and retirement security on the other. 15
Moreover, with plenty of avenues for self-help, enforcement of agreed-upon
accords in most instances did not depend on the will or resources of
governmental actors.
C SubstantiveRegulationsas IndividualRights
The two approaches discussed thus far largely rely on contractual
bargaining as the means for establishing substantive terms of employment,
though each seek to enhance that process in a different way. But if the aim is to
move toward certain labor conditions and employment practices, would it not
be easier if the government simply mandated those directly as a matter of
regulation? This sentiment underlies a third approach to economic regulations
regarding labor and employment--one in which political negotiations and
agency calculations replace private bargaining as the means by which
substantive terms of employment are set. Not only does this envision the
government engaging in substantive regulations, it also sees the government
guaranteeing these to workers as individual rights. As such, it can be argued
that this approach sees government intervention at the lowest level of the
national economy.
Direct efforts to regulate the terms and conditions of employment also
have a long history. As the famous Lochner v. New York 16 decision illustrates,
governmental efforts to establish what would normally be contractually
negotiated terms-like working hours-had not always been readily accepted.' 7
By the time the federal government enacted the Fair Labor and Standards Act in
1938, however, such laws were becoming increasingly commonplace. The
substantive approach to labor and employment regulations truly blossomed,
however, in the 1960s and 1970s. Partly in response to growing disillusionment
with labor unions and collective bargaining, and partly due to the broad political
mobilization of the civil rights movement, these decades witnessed a dramatic
expansion of direct federal intervention in the labor and employment market.' 8
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal for employers to
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, and gender, which would later be
expanded to include age, disability, and parental status. 19 The establishment of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 1971 made working
conditions and the availability of safety equipment a regulatory standard to be
set and enforced by a federal agency. 20 The passage of the Employee
15. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 127.

16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. See generally id.
18. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note I1, at 191-92.

19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (2006)).
20. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §661); see also EISNER, supra note
8, at 153-54.
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 introduced government regulations
and oversight into the operation of private retirement plans created by firms
and unions.21
The substantive approach not only imagines a more direct role for
governmental intervention in setting substantive terms of employment, but it
also encourages the issue to be thought of differently in a number of ways.
First, it shifts the locus of the labor issue away from the market and the
bargaining table and toward judicial hearings and the political process.
Second, it frames the underlying problems less as a matter of economic
structure or organizational relations and more as an issue of individual rights.
Workers are thus empowered to seek redress in court or through
administrative procedures. Yet it also means that they are more reliant on
political will and governmental resources. In addition, because rights are
often in conflict, rights consciousness has also led to increasing political
competition between different segments of workers. As the fight over
affirmative action shows, the rights of certain workers to racial equality are
often set against the rights of others arguing the same. 22
III. COMPETING APPROACHES TO IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS
We have looked at three different ways / that issues of labor and
employment have been regulated at the federal level. How have these
affected the development of our immigration system? This Part suggests that
the three approaches outlined above have played an influential role in shaping
our nation's immigration laws. They have also framed the political discourse
on immigration in a number of interesting ways.
A. The MacroeconomicApproach to ImmigrationRegulations

Given that the vast majority of immigrants arrive in the United States
looking for work, it makes sense that immigration regulations are often
looked to as a way of managing the U.S. labor market. Moreover, while there
are many disagreements about whether the federal government can or should
actively intervene in labor market conditions generally, its power and
responsibility to control immigration is largely uncontested. Because of this,
federal immigration regulations are most commonly seen as part of a broader
effort to manage the macroeconomic conditions of our national economy.
Not unlike goods and capital, immigrants are understood in this respect to be
one of the many variables that affect the national balance of our labor market.

21.

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.

§ 1002);

see also JAMES A.

wOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004).
22. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL
RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 33 (2001).
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It should be no surprise then that, for much of the nineteenth century,
immigrants were regulated as an article of commerce.23 Early border
regulations at the state and federal level largely paralleled the tariff system by
seeking to control immigration flows through the amount of taxes and bonds
to be assessed per head upon entry.24 Bilateral agreements between the
United States and other nations also served as a common means for regulating
the numbers and types of immigrants that entered.25 All of this affected the
judicial and political framing of immigration as a regulatory issue. It was the
reason why the U.S. Supreme Court initially justified federal jurisdiction over
immigration as part of its delegated power over international commerce and
foreign affairs.26 It is also part of the reason that the bureaucratic
administration of the earliest immigration regulations at the federal level were
delegated to the Treasury Department-the executive agency foremost
responsible for managing the national capital supply and the collection of
duties on foreign imports. 27
The immigration system today is more complex than in those earlier
years. Yet the macroeconomic approach continues to be an important
framework. At the most basic level this is because much of the immigration
flows that we receive today-both legal and illegal-can be traced back to
trade policies like the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994.28 At
the same time, our immigration system has begun experimenting with
different ways of importing immigrant labor as a temporary economic
supplement without necessarily going as far as to accept them as potential or
future citizens. In response to the labor shortage that arose in the agricultural
sector after immigration was dramatically curtailed in the 1920s, the federal
government quickly negotiated a series of guestworker programs with foreign
nations, most notably the "Bracero" program with Mexico.29 Today, our
immigration system makes important distinctions between a growing number
of temporary visa holders, mostly in the United States for work-related
reasons, and the permanent legal residents that are legally recognized as
immigrants with a path to citizenship. 30 There are even some who see the

23. See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1875).
24. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (overturning state head taxes of immigrants);
VINCENT J. CANNATO, AMERICAN PASSAGE: THE HISTORY OF ELLIS ISLAND 43, 69, 103, 182 (2009)

(describing the institution of a federal head tax and the many times it was raised as a means of discouraging
immigration).
25. See Angela M. Banks, The Trouble with Treaties: Immigration and Judicial Law, 98 ST. JOHN'S L.

REv. 1219, 1224-27 (2010).
26. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270.
27. CHRISTINA A. ZIEGLER-MCPHERSON, IMMIGRANTS IN HOBOKEN: ONE WAY TICKET, 1845-1985, at

69(2011).
28. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN
AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 48-49 (2003).
29. See generally DEBORAH COHEN, BRACEROS: MIGRANT CITIZENS AND TRANSNATIONAL SUBJECTS
IN THE POSTWAR UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (2011).

30. See 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(15)(H), (J), (L), (0) (2006).
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proliferation of undocumented immigration not as a failure in immigration
enforcement, but rather as a concession to the robust demand for flexible,
cheap, and unskilled labor that was not being met by domestic workers. 3 1 To
be sure, the fact that guestworkers and undocumented immigrants often prove
to be more permanent than their status would suggest complicates the
flexibility of immigrant labor. Many now feel, however, that the solution is to
go even further in reorienting our immigration system to address the
aggregate imbalances in our domestic labor market.
B. The LaborApproach to Immigration Regulations

Other times, however, the effect of immigration on the labor market is
understood less as a macroeconomic matter but rather more specifically
through the organizational lens of labor-management relations. From this
perspective, what matters is not simply how immigrants contribute to the
aggregate labor supply in the United States, but more probing inquiries over
what kind of workers they are and how their presence affects the balance of
power between employers and workers. In other words, if the development of
labor and employment standards is to be pursued primarily at the bargaining
table, then an important question with regard to immigration is how the
availability of foreign labor might affect this process.
Indeed, as the "labor question" became more significant as an economic
issue in the late nineteenth century, immigration was also increasingly being
perceived through industrial labor relations. Fears that immigrants would
frustrate labor organizing efforts, 32 or would be prone to labor militancy, 33
lay behind the passage of many of this nation's most restrictive immigration
laws. As employers increasingly relied on immigrants as strike breakers,
labor leaders began to cast doubt on whether immigrant labor is in fact "free
labor," and pushed the federal government to reverse its policy on foreign
labor recruitment. 34 This led first to the enactment of the "padrone" laws of
1874, which sought to limit the power of ethnic labor brokers, followed by the
Foran Act (also known as the Contract Labor Act) of 1885, which prohibited
the admission of immigrants who secured employment in the United States
before their arrival.3 5
Similar concerns about labor can also be seen behind many of the racebased restrictions that became the basis for federal immigration policy for
31. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 809, 847-48 (2007).
32. See 3 PHILIP SHELDON FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 1900-1909, at 258 (1964).
33. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at

55 (2002 ed.)
34.

See GUNTHER PECK, REINVENTING FREE LABOR: PADRONES AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE

NORTH AMERICAN WEST, 1880-1930, at 87 (2000).
35. See id. at 88-90
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much of the twentieth century. For example, stereotypes about Chinese
laborers being racially suited to lower standards of living, and thus always
willing to accept lower wages than white workers, played a big role in the
enactment of federal restrictions of Chinese immigrants in 1888.36 Similar
stereotypes about immigrants from eastern and, southern Europe also
prompted labor organizations to demand similar restrictions on the western
front. In an ironic twist, employers also started to turn against immigration as
well after an increase in labor agitation in immigrant-dominated industries
convinced them that this new group was more prone to socialist sentiments.37
It was before the backdrop of these tensions between labor and management
that the national quota restrictions of the 1920s, the most comprehensive and
draconian immigration laws yet, were enacted.
The transition to a labor-oriented view of immigration is also reflected in
how immigration responsibilities were administratively reorganized in the early
twentieth century. After several decades in the Treasury Department, the
Commissioner of Immigration was transferred to the short-lived Department of
Commerce and Labor in 1903. Moreover, when this department was split in
1913 into one in charge of commerce and another labor, immigration
responsibilities were allocated to the newly created Department of Labor as part
of its general mission to "foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage
earners of the United States, to improve their working conditions, and to
advance their opportunities for profitable employment." 38
Though much has changed, the labor-oriented approach continues to be a
visible issue in today's immigration debates. On the one hand, basic
questions about how immigration and labor laws are connected continue to be
at the heart of many of today's legal controversies. For example, in Hoffman
Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 39 the National Labor Relations Board argued
that awarding back pay to undocumented immigrants who had been
terminated for engaging in union activity not only did not conflict with federal
immigration enforcement, but actually supported it by ensuring that there was
no economic advantage to hiring undocumented immigrants for companies
that wished to avoid a unionized workforce. 40 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed, raising questions about labor as a regulatory priority in an era of
immigration enforcement. 4 1 Although Hoffman Plastic was decided in a
different regulatory climate, its views about the relationship between labor
and immigration were in stark contrast to those of federal courts in the 1980s,
36. See KATHERINE BENTON-COHEN, BORDERLINE AMERICANS: RACIAL DIVISION AND LABOR WAR IN
THE ARIZONA BORDERLANDS 77-78 (2009); LuCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW I1-12 (1995).

37. See SALYER, supra note 36, at 24-25.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Act to Create a Department ofLabor, Ch. 141, 37 Stat. 736 (1913) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 551 (2006)).
535 U.S. 137 (2002).
See idat 155-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 149-50 (majority opinion).
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revealing tensions behind how the relationship between labor and immigration
laws is perceived.42
On the other hand, spurred in part by the Hoffman decision and responding
to declining union levels, labor unions are also beginning to see immigrant
workers in a different light. National labor organizations like the AFL-CIO have
not only stepped up efforts to recruit immigrants into their ranks, but they have
also begun to take a more active stance in favor of pro-immigrant policies such as
amnesty for undocumented immigrants as a means of bringing them out of the
shadow economy and making them more amenable to unionizing efforts.43
Concerns that immigration enforcement is being used to frustrate or stifle union
organizing efforts are increasingly being voiced today.44 And it is in the context
of this debate that the labor movement is once again tied to developments in
immigration and immigration policymaking.
C. SubstantiveApproach to ImmigrationRegulations

Just as the macroeconomic and labor approaches have affected the
development of our immigration laws, the substantive approach to labor and
employment regulations has also had a tremendous impact. Rather than
simply looking at how the numbers and types of immigrants can be regulated
to address concerns about labor market conditions, the lesson of the
substantive approach is that federal immigration regulations can and should
be more specifically targeted at the employment relationship between
Moreover, given that these
immigrant workers and their employers.
substantive regulations are often thought of from the perspective of individual
or civil rights, this approach has also encouraged immigration to be thought of
in the same way. Indeed, as the following shows, not only have our
immigration laws increasingly turned to more direct and forceful efforts to
regulate employment relations involving immigrant workers, but the political
discourse against immigrants is also starting to draw upon the rhetoric of
competing rights.
The fact is that some of the earliest substantive regulations of labor
conditions and employment practices at the federal level were those that
covered immigrant workers. As noted earlier, many guestworker programs
were implemented in the United States in response to the labor shortages

42. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1183 (1979) ("Were we to hold the NLRA inapplicable
to illegal aliens, employers would be encouraged to hire such persons in hopes of circumventing the labor
laws. The result would be more work for illegal aliens and violations of the immigration laws would be
encouraged."); NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 360 (1978) ("Thus by refusing to certify unions with a
majority of alien members we would be giving employers an extra incentive to hire aliens and thus would be
defeating the goals of the immigration laws.").
43. See IMMANUEL NESS, IMMIGRANTS, UNIONS, AND THE NEW U.S. LABOR MARKET 40-45 (2005).
44. See Jennifer Medina, Immigrant Worker Firings Unsettle a College Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,

2012, at A13.
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produced by the immigration restrictions of the 1920s. 45 What is also
interesting, however, is the extent to which substantive regulations were
incorporated into their operiations. For example, the largest of these
guestworker arrangements-the "Bracero" program negotiated with
Mexico-not only set the minimum wages that employers had to pay, but also
specified many of the conditions in which the guestworkers lived and toiled.4 6
To be sure, these mandates were implemented in large part to ensure that
guestworkers did not compete unfairly with native workers. 4 7 Moreover,
these regulations were not always effectively enforced.4 8 Nevertheless, as a
regulatory matter, they represent not only some of the earliest and most
comprehensive federal efforts to mandate terms of employment as a
substantive matter, but also an innovation in how immigration policies can be
designed to serve economic interests while addressing concerns about labor
and employment.
The federal shift to substantive regulations of labor and employment in
the 1960s and 1970s had an even more profound impact on the development
of immigration laws. The abandonment of the racial quota system and the
liberalization of immigration law in 1965 were part of the same civil rights
movement that would later lead to the prohibition of discrimination in the
employment context. 49 Even more significant, however, appears to be the
regulatory response to undocumented immigration that developed afterwards.
Take, for example, the introduction of employer sanctions in 1986, which
made it illegal for any employer to hire immigrants who were unauthorized to
work in the United States and established a reporting system that required
employers to screen the immigration status of all potential employees. 50 This
process is now a cornerstone of our immigration system (and familiar to
anyone who has applied for a job). Yet it is hard to imagine it being
implemented at an earlier time, before the federal government had become so
deeply involved in regulating and supervising so many aspects of the
employment process.
Similarly, the turn to thinking about issues of labor and employment
from the perspective of rights has also had an effect on how we talk about
immigration. The irony is that while the rights framework has led to a
proliferation of antidiscrimination statutes protecting immigrants in the
workplace,51 the rhetoric of rights is also being used against immigrants,
particularly those who are unlawfully present. Immigration violations are
45.
46.
47.
48.

See generally COHEN, supra note 29.
See id at 22.
See id. at 22-23.
See id.

49. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 169 (2006).

50. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
51. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1), (g)(1)(B).
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traditionally considered to be civil offenses committed against our nation as a
whole. Since the 1970s, however, the presence and employment of
undocumented immigrants is also increasingly being portrayed as a violation
of the individual rights of native and legal workers.
It makes sense then that there have been so many efforts in recent
decades to create a private cause of action for aggrieved employees to sue
employers suspected of hiring undocumented immigrants. For example, in
Lopez v. ArrowheadRanches,52 native and legal immigrant workers asserted a
right to file suit against their employer for hiring undocumented immigrants
on the basis of both federal immigration and civil rights laws. 53 Similar
sentiment also led Congress to briefly consider creating an administrative
process whereby employees affected by the hiring of undocumented
immigrants could file claims against their employer. 54 Neither of these efforts
succeeded. Nevertheless, support for a private cause of action seems to be
gaining. Many of the controversial state immigration laws that have been
enacted specifically create a cause of action allowing workers to sue their
current or former employer for hiring undocumented immigrants.5 s What is
interesting is that these and other legal efforts not only draw upon processes
provided in employment regulations like Title VII's prohibition against racial
discrimination in hiring, but they also rely heavily on the rhetoric of rights to
frame the issue of undocumented immigration.
IV. COMPETING APPROACHES TO IMMIGRATION REFORM

There continue to be fierce disagreements over the proper role of
government regulations with respect to labor conditions and employment
practices. We see it in the debates about the federal fiscal, monetary, and
trade policies in the aftermath of the great recession. We also see it in recent
battles over the future of labor unions and collective bargaining. We have
also seen how these different approaches offer a useful framework for
understanding the development of our immigration laws. I argue here that
these competing views also continue to play an important role. Indeed, it may
be one of the key reasons why an immigration compromise proves to be so
elusive. In other words, what the immigration debate needs the most might
actually be a serious conversation about labor and employment.
Take, for example, the matter of wages. The impact of immigration on
the wages of native workers has long been one of the most contentious issues
52. 523 F.2d 924 (1975).
53. Id.
54.

NICHOLAS LAHAM, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 130 (2000).

55. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 23-212(B)

(2011) (providing a process for individuals to file

complaints against businesses); 2008 Miss. Laws 312 (creating a private cause of action for legal U.S.
residents laid off and replaced by unauthorized workers); 2008 Utah Laws 26 (creating a cause of action
against an employer for discharging a lawful employee while retaining an undocumented worker in the same
job category).
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in the immigration debates. With the recent economic recession and growing
concerns about income inequality, the wage effects of immigration seem all
the more important today. To be sure, there is actually very little consensus
on how immigration affects wage levels in our complex and dynamic
economy. Much depends on whether we believe immigrants compete directly
with native workers in the mainstream labor market or whether we believe
them to occupy a separate economic niche (i.e., doing jobs that Americans
will not do). There are also differences whether we focus on the aggregate
effect on wages across the board or zero-in on a particular group of American
workers. But even if we can come to an agreement about how immigration
affects wage levels in the United States, how should we go about using
regulation to correct that? It is division with respect to regulatory approaches,
I argue, around which much of the political paralysis surrounding immigration
is centered.
For some, tight immigration regulation coupled with strict enforcement is
the best way to address the wage impacts of immigration. There is, of course,
no simpler maxim in macroeconomics than the inverse correlation of supply
and prices: given constant demand, increase in supply leads prices to fall and
vice versa. In the labor context, high wages in a particular sector may reflect a
low supply of needed workers. Conversely, low or falling wages suggest the
opposite: an increase or oversupply of labor. Thus, for some, the fact that
wages are either too high or too low is merely a reflection of imbalances in the
labor market. One way to address it, then, is to adjust immigration levels to
ensure that immigrants will not crowd out native workers in areas where the
labor supply is high and demand is low, but will be welcomed into the country
to work in sectors where the opposite is true. From this perspective,
immigration controls are an important means by which wage levels in the
United States are managed. Thus, if we are concerned about wages, we should
look carefully at how many and what kind of immigrants the current
immigration system allows to join the U.S. labor market.
For others, however, the preferred way to address the relationship
between immigration and wages is flipped. Under this view, regulations that
intervene to set wages directly are not only a better way of dealing with
concerns about wage levels, but also provide a more productive way of
addressing immigration. 56 As noted earlier, many provisions of our
immigration laws already require employers to pay certain immigrant workers
the "prevailing wage."5 7 Moreover, given that most of the concerns about the
wage effects of immigration are at the low end of the economic spectrum,
many have suggested increasing the federal minimum wage as a good way of
56. See, e.g., Michael S. Dukakis & Daniel J. B. Mitchell, Raise Wages, Not Walls, N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 2006, at A19.

57. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (n)(1)(A) (2006).
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forestalling downward pressures. On the one hand, it can be argued that this
is a more efficient way of backstopping the decline of wages among low- or
non-skilled native workers than costly immigration enforcement initiatives
like border fences or mass deportation. On the other hand, for those primarily
interested in immigration enforcement, it can be argued that raising the
minimum wage in this manner would also reduce the demand for low-skilled
immigrant labor by eliminating the cost advantage that they traditionally
offered over native workers. In other words, if employers encourage
undocumented immigration by preferring immigrant workers who they can
pay less, then ensuring that they cannot pay less should reduce the demand for
undocumented workers. To the extent that it does not, it would reveal that
depressing wages is not a major problem of undocumented immigration.
Another perspective on the issue of immigration and wages, however,
posits that the integration of immigrant workers into the mainstream labor
market-no matter how they came to be a part of the American workforce-is
the most effective way to ensure that domestic wage levels are not distorted by
immigration.58 To be sure, integration in this manner may require immigration
controls in some cases to prevent oversaturation in particular labor markets. It
may also benefit from some substantive worker protections. But by themselves,
some argue, these regulations are not enough. Indeed, they may even be
counterproductive. Under this view, rather than seeking to disable immigrant
workers in the interest of protecting native workers, we should instead be
seeking to empower immigrant workers so that they can negotiate the labor
market in the same way as native workers. 59 At the most basic level, what this
means is that we should be wary of regulations that set immigrant workers apart
from native workers: visa restrictions that make it impracticable for some
immigrants to change jobs, illegal status that renders others permanently
vulnerable to reporting and thus beholden to the good graces of their employers,
and contract labor status that makes it impossible for them to organize. Though
designed in part to protect native workers, these regulations also encourage the
development of a bifurcated labor market in which immigrant workers may
actually be preferred by employers precisely because they do not have the same
power or freedom to demand higher wages or better working conditions. At a
deeper level, however, integration may also require more legal support for the
organizing and mobilization of workers more generally, especially in low-wage
sectors where they are the most vulnerable.
To the extent that the impact of immigration on wages is a concern,
these proposals illustrate the wealth of options that are available for dealing
with this issue. Yet, given the extent to which these different proposals
- 58. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Unions Urge Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants: Legalized Workers
Would Be EasierforLabor to Organize,S.F. CHRON., Feb. 17, 2000, at A3.
59. See COHEN, supranote 29, at 166.
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coincide with the competing views about the government's role in labor and
employment regulations outlined above, it is no surprise that the availability
of these options does not necessarily help us reach a political consensus on
immigration. While some are willing to go to great lengths to restrict
immigration as a means of protecting wages, they may simultaneously believe
that it is not the government's role to regulate those wages directly for fear of
the greater dangers that this would impose on the economy. Similarly, while
some may believe that immigration controls of some sort are necessary in
order not to dilute the collective power of workers to negotiate good wages on
their own, they may nevertheless believe that doing so in a way that bifurcates
the U.S. labor market is too heavy a cost for achieving those ends. What is
important to point out here is that although these beliefs translate into
different immigration policies, the difference between them is not rooted in
the conventional debate about immigration. Rather, it is embedded in a larger
debate about the wisdom and effectiveness of different government
interventions in labor market conditions and employment practices.
Wages is not the only issue in which competing views of labor and
employment regulations have an effect on how the immigration debates are
framed. Similar undercurrents can also be found in the way we talk about the
impact of immigration on such issues as working conditions and job security.
What all this suggests, however, is the need for a serious and frank
conversation about the federal role in labor and employment regulations as
means toward crafting an acceptable immigration compromise. Given the
contested history of labor and employment regulations at the federal level, it
is not likely that this conversation will be any easier than the one currently
taking place over immigration. Yet, as the foregoing shows, it is also a
mistake to assume that more emphasis on the immigration side of the equation
will ultimately prove to be more productive.
V. CONCLUSION

Immigration is a complex policy issue. It is complex in part because we
see its regulation as an important tool in economic policymaking more
generally. This Essay has focused on one aspect of economic policymaking
in the United States: the history and development of labor and employment
regulations. It has argued that federal regulations of labor conditions and
employment practices have historically oscillated between three distinct
approaches. Each sees the government intervening at a different level of the
national economy. Each sees a more or less direct role for the government
with regard to substantive terms of employment. This Essay has argued that
these competing approaches have not only shaped the development of U.S.
immigration policy over the years, but also continue to be a major, if often
overlooked, divide in today's immigration debates.
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There is no easy way to reconcile the different ways that labor conditions
and employment practices can be regulated. Yet foregrounding this effort
might be an important step in reaching a comprehensive solution to our
immigration problems. At the most basic level, we should recognize that
there are many different ways that labor and employment regulations can
address many of the underlying concerns surrounding immigration. Even
more important, it may be that much of the controversy over immigration is
actually a proxy battle over the condition of workers more generally in our
economic system. In either case, I argue, it is important not to overlook the
rich history and contested development of labor and employment regulations
in the context of immigration.

